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Abstract. This paper investigates the determinants of participation and 
performance of tobacco contract farmers, and the effects of participation 
on overall crop and household incomes in the Zambezi Valley of 
Mozambique. We test the existence of threshold effects in land holdings 
and educational attainment to identify the types of farmers that benefit. 
Several results stand out. First, participation in the schemes is driven by 
factor endowments, asset ownership and alternative income opportunities, 
and very little by demographic factors. Second, we find no returns to 
education in tobacco; this result is consistent with previous research in 
Mozambique but surprising in an agronomically demanding crop like 
tobacco.  Third, there appear to be economies of scale in tobacco 
production, perhaps through more efficient use of hired labor.  If true, 
tobacco could drive greater economic differentiation through the growth 
of “emergent” or commercial smallholder households – something that has 
been conspicuously lacking in Mozambique to date.  Fourth, farmers 
without wage income are more likely to grow tobacco; since other 
research shows that wage labor has driven most income growth in 
Mozambique over the past six years, tobacco could be inequality reducing.  
Tobacco growers also hire much more labor than non-growers, 
contributing to second-round inequality reducing effects.  Further analysis, 
preferably in a general equilibrium framework, is needed to understand 
how the simultaneous forces of economic differentiation and spreading of 
economic benefits will affect income distribution.  Potential adverse 
environmental impacts also deserve far more attention than they have 
received to date. 
 
JEL Codes:   C21, D1, L1, J43, Q12. 
 
Keywords:    Contract farming, selection bias, treatment effects, threshold 
effects, household income.  
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Interlinked Transactions in Cash Cropping Economies: The Determinants of 
Farmer Participation and Performance in the Zambezi River Valley of 
Mozambique 
 
1.  Introduction 
Contract farming is a pervasive institutional arrangement for cash cropping 
throughout the developing world. The persistence of this approach derives from two 
factors. First, smallholder farmers’ low shadow wage rates give them substantial cost of 
production advantages over larger farmers, especially on crops requiring high labor input.  
Second, small farmers often are cash constrained and have poor access to input and credit 
markets.  As a result processors, needing raw material to amortize fixed investments, 
provide these farmers with inputs (and possibly other services) on credit, and attempt to 
recover that credit upon purchase of the output.   
These arrangements have been analyzed at length for at least two decades (Minot, 
1986; Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Little and Watts, 1994).  However, empirical 
assessments based on detailed household level data and controlling for possible selection 
bias in participation, are relatively rare
1.  In this paper, we focus on tobacco contract 
farming schemes in the Zambezi Valley of Mozambique.  We develop two versions of 
sample selection models (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2003) to investigate the determinants 
of farmer participation, the determinants of net income from tobacco once in the scheme, 
and the effect of participation on overall crop income and total household income.  A key 
contribution of this paper is its investigation of threshold effects of education and land 
                                                 
1   See Warning and Key (2002) for a recent example with a much smaller sample size and fewer 
independent variables than we use here.  See also Jayne et al (2004) for application in a panel data set.   3
holdings; rather than focusing on the average effect of participation, we ask what type of 
farmer benefits from participation. 
Section two of the paper describes the study area and sampling procedures.   
Section three compares participants and non-participants, while Section four presents our 
conceptual and empirical models, and results.  We close with a discussion of policy 
implications. 
 
2.  Study Area Sample and Comparison of Means 
The study covered monopsony “concession” areas for Mozambique Leaf Tobacco 
(MLT), and DIMON-Mozambique, both operating tobacco contract farming schemes in 
Tete Province. The survey covered 159 farmers among growers (117) and non-growers 
(42), using a stratified random sampling procedure.  Households were interviewed twice: 
in March 2004 and September 2004.  See Benfica et al. (2005) for more details. 
  Participants and non-participants are not statistically different in terms of 
demographic characteristics such as household size, labor endowments, education, and 
age of the head (Table 1). Household headship is almost statistically significant with non-
growers more than twice as likely to be female-headed.   
  Growers have greater farm assets and are much likely to hire agricultural labor.  
Use of animal traction is low, and differences among households are not statistically 
significant, but sampled growers are nearly twice as likely as sampled non-growers to use 
this technology.  Sampled growers are 50% more likely to use fertilizer on maize, but this 
difference too is not statistically significant.  Notably, all farmers are much more likely to   4
use fertilizer than are farmers in other areas of the country
2.  Non-growers have more 
diversified incomes, though the only statistically significant difference is in the 
proportion earning wage labor income.  Growers have much higher mean household and 
agricultural incomes, both total and per capita.   
 
3.  Farmer Selection and Performance, and Effects of Participation 
  In this section we wish to explain (a) the determinants of tobacco income among 
growers, and (b) whether, and for whom, participation in the contract farming scheme 
affects total income from all crops and total household income from all economic 
activities.   To accurately explain these relationships, we have to account for unobserved 
factors that may affect both the likelihood of participation and the performance of 
farmers (Greene, 2003; Warning and Key, 2002). We do this by applying a two-stage 
Heckman model in two contexts: (a) a Sample Selection Model for the determinants of 
tobacco income among growers, and (b) a Treatment Effects Model to assess the impact 
of contract faming on overall cropping and total household income. The first step in both 
models uses all the observations in the sample to estimate the Probit Model: 
() ( ) i i i z z c γ Φ = = | 1 P r        ( 1 )  
where ci indicates participation in the cash cropping scheme, zi is vector of exogenous 
determinants of participation, and γ is a vector of coefficient estimates for the zi.   
The second step is a selection adjusted Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
to cover two models.   
 
                                                 
2   Nationally, about 4% use fertilizer on some crop.  Fertilizer is part of the input package for tobacco, and 
is also available in nearby Malawi.   5
The Tobacco Income Determinants Model uses the selected sample (ci=1) to run  
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where Aji (owned land area quartiles), Eki (education attainment dummies), and xi, are a 
subset of zi from the first stage.
3 The inverse mills ratio, IMR (λ), is obtained for each 
observation i as λi = ø(γzi)/Φ(γzi), where  ø(γzi) is the normal density function.  
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The Threshold Treatment Effects Model uses the full sample to run:  
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where, Ci is the participation dummy, Aji refers to owned land area quartiles and Eki are 
education attainment dummies, as described in (2). All land and education variables are 
interacted with the participation dummy to test for threshold effects. The hazard ratio, hi, 
for each observation i is computed from (1) as  ( ) ( ) i i i z z h γ γ φ Φ = / i f   1 = i c , and 
() () [] i i i z z h γ γ φ Φ − = 1 / i f   0 = i c  where ( ) i i z h γ φ =  and  ( ) i z γ Φ  are respectively the density 
and distribution functions of the standard normal evaluated at z. The model generates 
estimates of the treatment-effects and threshold coefficients γ,  αj’s and δj’s, the β´s 
(effects of other variables), and the sample selection bias coefficient (ρ).  We test for 
sample selection bias under a null hypothesis of ρ=0.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Elements excluded from zi are known as exclusion restrictions.   6
3.1.  Farmer Participation and Performance in Contract Farming 
  Probit results in Table 2 indicate that household participation in contract farming 
is more associated with technology, income diversification opportunities and asset 
endowments than with demographic characteristics. While point estimates indicate that 
female headed households are less likely to engage in tobacco production, the statistical 
significance of that result is not strong.  As expected, the availability of draft power, the 
value of hand tools, and (though not quite significant) the value of other production and 
marketing equipment, including bicycles, are positively associated with participation. 
Unexpectedly, larger households appear less likely to grow tobacco, though this 
result is not quite statistically significant. Warning and Key (2002) found a similar result 
in Senegal.  Also surprising, in light of the means comparisons in Table 1, is that 
households with more land appear no more likely than others to grow tobacco.   
Households with access to alternative sources of income, especially livestock and wages, 
are less likely to participate in the contract farming schemes.
4  
Previous work in nearby areas of Mozambique suggested that households with 
access to wage labor markets tended to maintain access to them over time, and were 
unlikely to invest earnings from those activities in agriculture (Tschirley and Benfica, 
2002).  In this light, our finding that households with wage labor income are less likely to 
growth tobacco raises an interesting question: has the cash cropping scheme provided 
additional income earning options to those households with lesser access to wage labor 
markets?  If so, will this pattern result in broader-based income growth?  The possibility 
that cash cropping schemes in these areas may be inequality reducing deserves further 
                                                 
4  Hausman tests for each of these income diversification variables failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity.    7
analysis.   
The insignificant coefficient on lambda in the second step suggests the absence of 
sample selection bias
5.  Key results include: 
  Female headed households earn less from tobacco than their male counterparts;   
  Land has no effect on net tobacco income until the fourth land area quartile, when 
it has a large and highly significant effect;   
  Value of hand tools and other equipment are positively associated with tobacco 
income; and 
  Agro-ecology matters. Farmers operating in mid-altitude areas of the north 
(Macanga-MLT and Mualadzi-DIMON) have profits similar to those in Angónia-
MLT (the omitted dummy also in a mid-altitude area), while those in Luia-
DIMON and Marávia-MLT in the lower and drier south have statistically lower 
profits.  
 
3.2.  The Effects of Contract Farming on Total Crop and Household 
Income 
  In this model we consider two OLS regressions in the second stage: determinants 
of net crop income and of total household income. Explanatory variables are identical in 
each regression (Table 3).
6  The models return an adjusted R
2 of 0.44 and 0.43, 
respectively. 
  The construction of our interaction terms (CF with two education dummies and 
                                                 
5 A specification with continuous education and land variables in both steps gave a significant coefficient 
on lambda, but similar patterns and magnitudes on other coefficients. 
6 We used exactly the same selection equation applied in the previous section, and so do not emphasize the 
probit results here.   8
three land area dummies) means that the coefficient on CF reflects the effect of 
participation in the contract farming scheme of households in the lowest land area 
quartile (the omitted land dummy) who also have no formal education (the omitted 
education dummy). Effects of participation for other households are captured by the sum 
of the coefficients on CF and the relevant interaction terms.  Table 4 reports the 
combined effects and F statistics for tests of the joint significance of these variables. 
The models find no returns to education in agriculture, regardless of a 
household’s participation status in the contract farming schemes.  Education beyond three 
years does significantly increase total household income, likely reflecting higher off-farm 
earnings of more educated households; participation in contract farming by such 
households almost entirely offsets this advantage, though this effect is not significant.  
These results are consistent with Walker et a.l’s (2004) national analysis, and with 
Tschirley and Benfica (2002). Nonetheless, it’s surprising that, even in a crop that 
requires careful management and pays high premiums for quality, education seems to 
have no impact.   
Three results stand out related to land holdings.  First, as shown by the similar 
magnitudes of the land area coefficients in both regressions of Table 3, the impact of 
larger land holdings on agricultural income is almost entirely reflected in total household 
incomes; households with more land do not appear systematically to be giving up off-
farm incomes.  Second, the impact of larger land holdings stabilizes or falls for non-
participants after the third land area quartile – agricultural incomes of fourth quartile non-
participants are not substantially different from those of third quartile non-participants, 
and household incomes are actually lower in the fourth quartile.  Finally, as in Table 2,   9
participation in contract farming has no impact on overall crop income until the fourth 
quartile, when its effect is very large.  This result suggests the presence of economies of 
scale in tobacco production (at least within the land area sizes seen in this sample), 
perhaps through more efficient use of hired labor.  If true, the result suggests the 
possibility of substantial growth in coming years in the number of “emergent” or 
commercial smallholder households, driven by profit opportunities in tobacco.  This class 
of farmers has been conspicuously lacking in Mozambique to date (Walker et al., 2004).  
Interestingly, even these large tobacco growers do not appear to give-up off-farm income 
(see “combined effects” in Table 4)
7.  The ready availability of experienced labor in the 
area may be a key factor driving this result.   
  Female headed households earn lower crop incomes, but differences in total 
incomes are not statistically significant; this suggests that diversification into off-farm 
activities by female headed households reduces gender inequality.  Ownership of 
equipment beyond hand tools appears to increase agricultural incomes: though the 
coefficient is not quite significant in the agricultural income regression, it is significant in 
the total income model and its magnitude is nearly identical. 
4.  Summary of Policy Implications 
Key results from this analysis relate to the impacts of education, land holdings, 
and access to wage labor.  The lack of returns to education in a crop as demanding as 
tobacco is surprising.  Perhaps the best interpretation is that great scope remains for 
improving field practices, yields, and profitability; as companies strengthen their 
extension efforts and more farmers have more time to learn proper techniques, we expect 
                                                 
7  Comparable analysis on national agricultural household data, limited to villages with tobacco growers, 
gives similar results.   10
more educated farmers to begin earning higher returns from tobacco.   
Results on land holding size and access to wage labor may tell an interesting 
story.  Tschirley and Benfica (2002) showed that those with wage labor income tend to 
maintain it for long periods of time.  Boughton et al. (2005) showed that most income 
growth throughout the country over the past six years has come from off-farm incomes, 
especially wage labor.  The research in this paper shows that households with such 
income are less likely to grow tobacco; households without such income are the ones 
taking advantage of the tobacco opportunity (Tables 1 and 2).  As a result, tobacco 
cultivation may reduce income inequality.  However, many smaller farmers earn negative 
profits from tobacco, while larger farmers tend to earn large positive profits.  Over time, 
this pattern could drive substantial expansion in the number of “emergent” smallholder 
farmers in the area.  Those left behind will be the smaller farmers who also have little 
access to wage labor opportunities. 
This paper has not formally explored the growth linkage effects of tobacco 
cultivation.  We know from Table 1 that one linkage effect is through the hiring of labor.  
Farmers unable to earn profits in tobacco and without access to more stable salary income 
are likely to be beneficiaries.  Currently, however, some of this labor is supplied by 
Malawians; continuation of an open border migration policy is important for continued 
expansion of the sector.  
Technological and environmental spillovers need to be more closely examined.  
On the positive side, growers and non-growers both are far more likely to apply fertilizer 
on food crops than are farmers in other areas of the country.  On the negative side, the 
rate of tree cutting by tobacco growers far surpasses the rate of planting (Benfica, et al.,   11
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Table 1.  Comparison of Means for Tobacco Growers and Non-Growers 
Type of Farmers 
(mean values) 










  t-Stat  P > | t |  Significance Level 
of the Difference 
1/ 
Demographic Characteristics            
            
     Female Headed Households – Percent  5.13  11.90    - 1.49  0.14   
     Education of HH Head – years  3.22  2.76    1.00  0.32   
     Age of Household Head – years  38.50  40.52    - 0.95  0.34   
     Labor - Adult Equivalents 3.45  3.68    -  0.88  0.38   
            
Farm Assets            
            
     Total Area – hectares  6.94  4.36    2.84  0.01  ** 
     Reported Value of Manual Tools - $US  28.63  15.59    2.16  0.03  * 
     Reported Value of Equipment - $US  66.60  36.63    2.58  0.01  ** 
     Use of Animal Traction – percent  7.69  4.76    0.64  0.52   
            
Use of fertilizer in Maize – Percent  32.47 21.42    1.35  0.18   
            
Use of Hired Labor            
            
     Permanent Labor – Percent Using  71.79  30.95    4.98  0.00  ** 
            
Income Diversification  - Percent            
            
     Livestock    93.98  96.15    - 0.44  0.66   
     Self-employment  60.15  53.85    0.56  0.55   
     Wage Labor Employment 24.81  53.84    -  3.03  0.00  ** 
            
Household Income  - $US            
            
     Net Household Income 1,815.28  1,022.48    2.35  0.02  * 
     Net Household Income per capita  318.06  174.70    2.36  0.02  * 
     Net Agricultural Income
  1,572.70  595.47    3.11  0.00  ** 
     Net Agricultural Income per capita  274.23  98.26    3.18  0.00  ** 
            
     Wage Labor Income  80.76  122.35    - 0.92  0.36   
     Self-employment (non-agricultural)  90.24  185.90    - 1.14  0.26   
     Livestock Income  90.11  79.50    0.35  0.73   
                   
 Number of observations  117  42         
            
1/ Significance levels: 
+ 10%, * 5%, ** 1%.
  Source: Zambezi Valley Cotton and Tobacco Concession Areas Study, 
2004.    13
 
Table 2.  Determinants of Net Income from Tobacco Production 
Parameter Estimates  
1
st Stage: Participation 
1/   2
nd Stage: Net Income from Tobacco 
 
Explanatory Variables 
  Coeff   z  P > | z |  LS
2    Coeff  t-stat   P > | t |  LS
2 
                 
Demographics 
3/                 
   Female headed household  - 0.375  0.84 0.40      -  405.56 1.95  0.05 * 
   Age of household head  - 0.013  0.89  0.38      - 5.44  0.82  0.42   
   Labor adult equivalents  - 0.154 1.29  0.20     106.51  1.26 0.21   
   Education: 1-3 years  - 0.071  0.20 0.84      -  148.86 0.66  0.51   
   Education  >3 years  0.024  0.06 0.95     17.55 0.07  0.94   
                 
Assets and Technology 
4/                 
      Area_Q2  0.333 0.92  0.36     247.07  1.36 0.18   
   Area_Q3  0.027  0.06  0.95      - 78.32  0.34  0.74   
      Area_Q4  0.500 0.96  0.34     780.34  2.30 0.02  * 
   Use of Animal traction  1.198 2.35  0.02  *   198.83  0.48 0.63   
   Value of manual tools  0.023  1.70 0.09 +    8.47 1.79  0.08 + 
   Value of other equipment  0.004  1.22 0.22      3.86 1.51  0.13   
                 
Diversification Activities                 
   Has livestock income  - 1.026  1.90  0.06  +           
   Has Self-employment income  0.257  0.89  0.37             
   Has wage labor income  - 0.879  2.88  0.00  *           
                 
Agro-Ecological Effects                 
   Mid-Altitude                 
      Macanga – MLT   - 0.831  2.15 0.03 *   30.78 0.10  0.92   
      Mualádzi – DIMON  0.161  0.43  0.67      83.19  0.41  0.69   
      Angónia – MLT (dropped)                   
   Lower Altitude                 
      Marávia – MLT  - 0.361  0.85 0.40      -  600.79 2.68  0.01  ** 
      Luia – DIMON  - 0.543  1.17  0.24      - 787.16  3.72  0.00  ** 
                 
Lambda (Inverse Mills Ratio)            229.53  1.03  0.31   
                      
Constant  1.544  1.85 0.07 +    -  170.74 0.41  0.68   
Number of observations  159          117       
Wald chi2 (18)  45.25                 
Prob > chi2  0.0004                 
Pseudo  R2  0.25               
Log pseudo-likelihood    - 81.62                 
F (16, 100)            4.12       
Prob > F            0.0000       
R – Squared            0.46       
Root  MSE           913.62      
1/ Probit equation for participation, 1 if participates, 0 otherwise. 
2/ Level of significance (LS): 
+ 10%, * 5%, ** 1%.
   
3/No schooling (Education=0) is excluded. 
4/ Quartile 1 (Area_Q1) is excluded.  Source: Zambezi Valley Tobacco 
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Table 3.  Effects of Tobacco Contract Farming (CF) on Net Agricultural Income and Net 
Total Household Income: Model with Land and Education Threshold Effects 
OLS Parameter Estimates – Tobacco Areas 




  Coef. Robust 
S.E.  
P |Z|>z  LS






                
Participates in CF  407.70  555.62  0.46      85.87  568.47  0.88   
                
Demographics                
   Female head household  - 488.01 239.68  0.04  *    0.66 282.52 0.99  
   Age of household head  4.85  10.32  0.64      15.85  11.04  0.15   
   Labor Adult equivalents  25.44  98.06  0.80     -  3.99 105.43 0.97   
                
Education Threshold Effects 
3                
   Education: 1-3 years  195.32 258.15  0.45     269.76 259.28 0.30  
   Education  >3 years  361.14 312.48  0.25     718.92 320.28 0.03 * 
   [Education : 1-3]*CF  - 482.02 572.20  0.40    -  452.16 581.29 0.44  
   [Education >3]*CF  - 637.32  581.68  0.28    -  703.27 585.63 0.23  
                
Land Threshold Effects 
4                
   Area_Q2  527.93  222.43  0.02  *    401.17  257.28  0.12   
   Area_Q3  665.13  331.93  0.05  *    820.94  279.98  0.00  ** 
   Area_Q4  723.32  396.06  0.07  +    691.65  359.09  0.06  + 
   Area_Q2*CF  - 129.33  349.50  0.71      4.26  377.02  0.99   
   Area_Q3*CF  166.40  553.41  0.76      - 18.28  517.81  0.97   
   Area_Q4*CF  1,305.86  631.67  0.04  *    1,575.96 652.95 0.02 * 
                
Assets and Technology                 
   Use Animal traction  - 56.43 601.06  0.93    -  275.33 620.81 0.66  
   Value of tools  8.59  9.14 0.35      5.72 8.82  0.52   
   Value of equipment  4.31 2.81 0.13      4.38 2.39  0.07  + 
   Use of fertilizer in maize  12.99 250.38  0.96     -  22.13 244.14 0.93  
                
Agro-Ecological Effects                
   Mid-altitude                
      Macanga – MLT   165.83 371.25  0.66    -  159.92 345.50 0.64  
      Macanga*CF  662.23  722.84  0.36     942.34 722.45 0.19  
      Mualadzi – DIMON  774.05  459.01  0.09  +    423.32  419.30  0.32   
      Mualadzi*CF  182.69  602.86  0.76      357.91  586.89  0.54   
      Angonia – MLT   224.71  341.65  0.51      - 91.76  283.13  0.75   
      Angonia*CF  141.48  553.88  0.80      265.72  545.30  0.63   
   Lower altitude                
      Maravia – MLT  - 12.51 410.23  0.98    -  244.43 382.95 0.52  
      Maravia*CF  90.38  772.74  0.91      36.57  760.10  0.96   
      Luia – DIMON (excluded)                   
h (hazard ratio)  331.11  246.49  0.18      68.56  242.59  0.78   
Constant -  1,101.09  793.64  0.17    -  679.39 773.48 0.38  
N  159        159      
F (27, 131)  4.11        4.92     
Prob > F  0.0000          0.000       
R – Squared  0.44          0.43       
Root  MSE  1,207.00        1,258.10      
1/ OLS regressors. 
2/ Level of significance (LS): 
+ 10%, * 5%, ** 1%.
   
3/No schooling (Education=0) is excluded. 
4/ 
Quartile 1 (Area_Q1) is excluded.  Source: Zambezi Valley Tobacco Concession Areas Study, 2004.       15
 Table 4.  F-Tests of Joint Significance of CF and Education and Land Thresholds 
Net Agricultural Income Regression    Net Total Household Income Regression   
Combined 
Effect 
F(2,131)   Prob>F LS
1/  Combined 
Effect 
F(2,131)   Prob>F LS
1/ 
CF-Education Threshold Effects                 
   CF and [Education : 1-3]*CF  (74) 0.40  0.67     (366) 0.40  0.67   
   CF and [Education >3]*CF  (229)  0.61  0.54      (617)  0.92  0.40   
                 
CF-Land Threshold Effects                 
   CF and Area_Q2*CF  279  0.33  0.72      90  0.01  0.99   
   CF and Area_Q3*CF  574  0.28  0.76      68  0.01  0.99   
   CF and Area_Q4*CF  1,714  2.26  0.10  +    1,662  2.91  0.05  * 
1/ Level of significance (LS): 
+ 10%, * 5%, ** 1%.
   Source: Zambezi Valley Cotton and Tobacco Concession Areas 
Study, 2004.     
 
 
 
 